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Fear of becoming minority as a
motivator of conflict in the former
Yugoslavia
Dejan Jović
It  is  not  the  Party’s  role  to  act  as  a  programmed  executor  of  the  “will  of  the
majority”... , [The Party] had to see deeper and further than the broad mass of the
people and the ‘majority.
Edvard Kardelj, 1967
In this sense, one cannot talk here of minority and majority when it comes to the
nations  in  Kosovo.  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  are  not  a  minority  in  relations  to
Albanians in Kosovo, just like the Albanians are not a minority in Yugoslavia.
Slobodan Milošević, 1987
When we think about the idea that a majority vote should be introduced in a multi-
ethnic federation, we ask : is this anything else but a denial of the equality of the
peoples,  a  denial  of  sovereignty  and  of  their  right  to  self-determination  as  an
inalienable human right.
Milan Kučan, 1989
1 Much of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is result of fears among its main ethnic
groups  (whether  “nations”  or  “nationalities”)  of  becoming  minorities  in  newly
independent states. It is often argued that those fears are a result of “ancient ethnic
hatred” and of the revival of memories of the horrors of the World War II among the
Yugoslav ethnic groups. In this paper a different line of argument is presented. I argue
that fears of losing ethnic status from “nations” or “nationality” to that of a “minority”
are to be understood within a context of the collapse of the ideological narrative of self-
management,  which was not based on the rule of the majority,  but on the notion of
consensus  and  “self-managing  harmonisation”.  Destruction  of  this  self-managing
narrative  of  “no-minority-no-majority”  and  its  replacement  with  the  one  of
representative democracy (which included the “creation” of both majority and minority)
fundamentally disturbed inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia. A democratic Yugoslavia
would make all ethnic groups (including the Serbs) what they really were - a minority.
The fear  of  becoming a  minority  (which was  created by  nationalist  members  of  the
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counter-elite) was the main reason why a large segment of the population supported
separation. Rejection of a democratic Yugoslavia was not an “inevitable” outcome of some
“ancient ethnic hatred” but a product of combined efforts by conservative members of
the  political  elites  (which in  the  whole  post-war  period opposed to  “unitarism” and
“great-statist  tendencies”)  and  the  nationalist  counter-elite  (mostly  in  intellectual
circles).  These two groups were successful  in convincing the dominant ethnic groups
within their republics that it was in their interest to be a majority in a smaller, rather
than minority in larger (and more complex, Yugoslav) state.  At the same time, those
segments  of  the  former  “constitutive  nations”  and  “nationalities”  which  in  new
circumstances  became minorities  (especially  Serbs,  but  also  Croats  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as well as Albanians in Serbia) refused to accept the new concept for the
same reason : they feared they would become minorities at territories in which they once
had been recognised as  constitutive.  The fears  of  being existentially endangered if  a
minority,  led all  these groups (Slovenes,  Croats,  Bosnian and Croatian Serbs,  Serbian
Albanians, Bosnian Croats) towards separatism, and in most cases to authoritarian and
military  styles  of  governing  in  their  new  political  entities.  I  argue  that  the  fear  of
becoming a  minority  was,  and remains,  a  major  motivator  of  conflict  in  the  former
Yugoslavia. Subsequently,  that  conflict  is  likely  to  continue  for  as  long  as  the  main
Yugoslav ethnic groups fear for their survival. 
 
The Narrative of Yugoslav Socialism : « No-Majority-
No-Minorities »
2 In the socialist Yugoslav federation (1945-1992) all ethnic groups were in a minority : yet
the constitutive narrative upon which the social project was based did not recognise the
concept of a minority. No ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia was larger than Serbs,
but they were only 36,3 % of the Yugoslav population in 1981. The largest ethnic group,
therefore, was still a minority in Yugoslavia with regard to the total population, just as
any other ethnic group. Furthermore, just as other main ethnic groups in Yugoslavia (all
except  Bosnian  Muslims,  Albanians  and  Macedonians)  their  share  in  population  was
decreasing1. While in 1961 Serbs made 42,1 % of the population, in 1981 they were 36,3 %.
The share of Croats also fell in this period from 23,2 % to 19,7 %. With a growing number
of those who declared themselves Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense (increasing from 1,7 % to
5,4 % between 1971 and 1981, with an estimation for this number to reach up to 25 % until
2001), Yugoslavia was on its way of becoming even more complex and heterogeneous
than ever before. 
3 At the same time, the self-managing rhetoric of the Yugoslav communists did not include
concepts such as “minorities” and “majorities”. In the ethnic sense, the term “national
minority” was treated as an outdated category which belonged to the old, pre-socialist
political vocabulary. Instead of “minorities” and “majorities”, the official classification
differentiated between “(constitutive) nations” (narodi) and “nationalities” (narodnosti),
leaving some space for “ethnic communities” (etničke zajednice) in a somewhat gray area
of political  vocabulary.  The  six  Slavonic  constitutive  nations  were  not  treated  as
“minorities” in any part of the Yugoslav territory, not even in those areas where they
were in minority (for example, Serbs in Croatia or in Kosovo, Croats in Vojvodina or
Bosnia, etc.).  Accordingly,  unlike  Italians,  Albanians  and  Hungarians,  they  were  not
offered institutional protection which would normally accompany their “minority” status
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(autonomous  provinces,  publishing  houses,  newspapers,  separate  schools,  etc.).
Nationalities were also not treated as “minorities”. Where they were in majority of the
local  population  (such  as  Albanians  in  Kosovo),  their  position  was  institutionalised.
Where they were in minority (such as Albanians in Macedonia, Italians in Croatia and
Slovenia, Hungarians in Vojvodina) – their status did not differ much from a status of
“constitutive nations” when in a minority. 
4 It is not only in the political history of Yugoslavia, but also in its constitutive ideology
where one can find an explanation for why the notions of “minority” and “majority” were
excluded from the political vocabulary.  According to the self-managing concept upon
which the Yugoslav political system was based, the division of society to its “majority”
and “minority”, not only in ethnic but also in political and economic sense, was to be
overcome as the process of transition to communism advanced. By decentralisation and
“socialisation”  of  the  state  (podruštvljavanje  države),  the  self-managing  doctrine
constructed a « new form of political and social self-managing community of working
people  and  citizens »  in  which  « self-managing  agreements  and  harmonisation »  (
samoupravno sporazumijevanje i dogovaranje) should replace permanent divisions between
“majorities” and “minorities”2.  The self-managing process should include everyone or
nearly  everyone;  in  theory  all  “self-managers”,  (samoupravljače),  which  were  the
“subjective force of socialism”, with a noticeable exception of the anti-socialist forces.
The “subjective forces of socialism” were entitled to organise public affairs by gradually
replacing the state,  through a net of organisations such as “workers councils” in the
sphere of production and “Socialist Alliance of Working People” in the sphere of politics.
The  Yugoslav  communists  aimed  at  replacing  the  state  with  an  “association  of  free
producers”. The working class – once the main subject of revolution – was withering away
as the process of socialism was advancing towards its realisation. Terms such as “working
people and citizens” (radni ljudi i gradjani) were introduced as a replacement for “class”.
While a “class” could be a minority,  the phrase “working people and citizens” was a
category  which  covered  neither  a  minority  nor  a  majority.  It  was  the  whole the  of
population, and it included all except “anti-socialist enemies”.
5 Although self-managing socialism recognised the importance of massive participation,
and in fact claimed to be the first type of society to include majority of population into
process of political decision-making, it was not based on the majority rule principle. As the
Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) stated in 1958, to be “in the
interest” of the majority does not necessarily mean to be supported by the same majority.
The majority might be unaware of its own best interests – it might be “blind” about them.
This  is  why  –  especially  in  the  “first  phase  of  socialism”,  in  the  immediate  post-
revolutionary period - a vanguard is needed to show the proper way and to educate the
masses. « Communists, says the Programme of the LCY, must educate the working people
to take a greater, more direct and more independent share in the managing of society,
and to think and act in a socialist manner, until the very last citizen has learnt to manage
the affairs of the community »3. Intellectual superiority (“far-sightedness” – dalekovidnost)
and not  the will  of  majority  was  what  legitimised the Communist  power.  Or,  as  the
leading ideologue of Yugoslav socialism, Edvard Kardelj concluded in 1967 : 
That democracy is not synonymous with rule by erratic impulse and that it is not
the Party’s role to act as a programmed executor of the “will of the majority” are
fundamentals never forgotten by the Party despite its consistent commitment to
democratic goals and the masses. If the party meant to remain the leading force of
society, it had to see deeper and further than the broad mass of the people and the
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“majority”. The party had to perceive the principal historical meaning of its leading
ideological  and  political  role  in  elaborating  the  long-term  goals  of  progressive
social action and in persevering in its work of transmitting its progressive learning
to the broad masses of the people4.
6 It was not only possible, but somehow given by definition that the “vanguard” was not a
majority of the population. Communist parties were, for example, clearly a minority in all
countries of socialist hemisphere, though they aimed at gradually embracing the majority
– and, ideally, the whole population5. Socialism was a process of ideological expansion of
the vision formulated by the “classics of Marxism” and interpreted by the communist
parties  to  the  whole  of  society.  Although coercion  remained an  important  factor  in
preventing  a  “counter-revolution”,  the  real  change  could  happen  only  when  the
intellectual mission of the Party “once and for all” prevailed over other interpretations of
reality and other “directions of development”6.
7 The aim of this process was communism, a classless and stateless social formation, based
not on the rule of a majority but on harmony, justice and equality among the people.
Communism will, once it occurs, not tolerate minorities as a political fact, since their
existence would keep the state alive.  Being the instrument of  the “ruling class”,  the
socialist  state  indeed  was  conceptualised  as  the  instrument  of  the  “majority”  over
“minorities”, but with a tendency towards self-destruction.
8 The anti-state narrative and action that followed it were the key elements of Yugoslav
identity under the Communists. The entire project of Yugoslav socialism was based on
criticism of Soviet “statism” and of its “hegemonic role” within the world of socialist
states.  In its essence,  therefore,  the Yugoslav project was anti-statist.  Treating Soviet
socialism as “revisionism”,  the Yugoslav Communists linked elements of  the national
tradition with strict implementation of the Marxist notion of the “withering away of the
state”.  The  other  antipode  for  the  Yugoslav  anti-statist  narrative  was  the  inter-war
(bourgeois, centralised, “unitarist”) Yugoslavia. Socialist Yugoslavia was to be radically
different from it (i.e. revolutionary). It was also meant to be different from both Western
and  Soviet  models,  both  of  which  were  treated  as  “statist”.  Instead,  the  Yugoslav
communists aimed at constructing a new type of social organisation, which would deny
the existence of either the “majority” or “minorities” and would reduce the role of the
state.  The  whole  history  of  Yugoslav  socialist  federalism  was  based  on  this  vision.
Decentralisation of the state was not a result of ethnic pressures from within the country
or external pressures from the international community (although both these elements
played some role), but was a vision-driven process, initiated primarily by the political
elite itself7.
9 In the Yugoslav case, even the word “Party” was in 1952 replaced by the “League” – not
only a clear distinction from both the Soviet and West-European cases, but also a clear
indication that Yugoslav Communists do not want to represent a part but the whole of
society. Kardelj’s later opposition to any “party-system”, whether “one-” or “multi-party”
went as far as saying that in Eastern Europe one party had taken over the role that was
performed by many parties in the West, but that was all. Real democracy, however, is
only direct, self-managing democracy, to which neither “one-” nor “multi-party” systems
can contribute8.  What one can conclude from Kardelj’s criticism of both types of then
existing political systems is that neither the rule of a minority nor of the majority per se is
not a guarantor of socialist transformation. Both of them could be (and in reality, as
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Kardelj believed, were) in certain circumstances potentially damaging for the socialist
project. The only real guarantor is the LCY and its clear and coherent vision.9
10 The main instrument of this expansion of what once was a party to the whole of society
was  education10.  Socialism was  a  “large  classroom” in  which the  party  “taught”  the
majority (workers) about their own interests, and took care that these interests were
realised despite of the will of various majorities and minorities11.
11 The Party had a monopoly on the vision of the future. As Tito said in his concluding
speech at the XI LCY Congress 1978 : 
Following a critical Marxist analysis of social trends, the League of Communists has
arrived at  scientific  data  about  the  essence  of  social  processes.  On this  basis  it
established the directions of the further development of the revolution, ensuring
its continuity. At the same time, it armed the working class with these data, making
it the conscious subject of socialist development12.
12 In this process, of course, concepts such as “minorities” and the “majority” could hardly
find a  place.  The  communist  party  could  not  call  itself  a  “minority”,  although –  by
criterion of simple counting – that is precisely what it was. But the project it led did not
aim at the rule of the majority, such as in representative democracies. The majority was
not automatically treated as the legitimate ruler, as in representative democracies. In
certain situations, i.e. if the achievements of the socialist revolutions were endangered,
even if by majority of the population, it was legitimate to intervene against this majority
(for example in Czechoslovakia 1968).
13 To conclude  this  overview of  the  narrative  of  Yugoslav  socialism :  concepts  such  as
“minority”  and  “majority”  were,  for  the  Yugoslav  communists,  closely  linked  to
representative democracies, i.e. to “bourgeois political systems”, and therefore avoided in
the  constitution  itself.  This  ideological  position  was  at  the  core  of  the  institutional
structure  of  the  Yugoslav  federation,  in  which  republics  (and  in  some  cases  even
provinces) were all treated as equal at the federal level, regardless of the size of their
population or territory. Also, within multi-ethnic republics, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, other “constitutive nations” or “nationalities” were not
offered any special status or institutional autonomy. Nor were they offered such a status
in Kosovo. Although Albanians were the majority in Kosovo, and Serbs in Serbia,  the
narrative of the regime did not recognise that either of these groups was a majority (and
thus  should  rule  as  the  majority  rules  in  representative  democracies,  i.e.  to  form
government regardless of the opposition) or a minority (and thus should be protected in
the territories where it  was a minority).  Instead, the rhetoric of « no minorities -  no
majorities »  continued even in the first  years  after  Slobodan Milošević’s  accession to
leading positions in Serbia. Speaking in Kosovo Polje in April 1987, Milošević said :
In this sense, one cannot talk here of minority and majority when it comes to the
nations  in  Kosovo.  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  are  not  a  minority  in  relations  to
Albanians in Kosovo, just like the Albanians are not a minority in Yugoslavia, but
are  a  nationality  [narodnost]  that  lives  together  and  in  equal  rights  with  other
nations and nationalities in three of our socialist republics13.
14 In the case of differences or a conflict between the Yugoslav nations and republics, it was
left  to  the  Party,  not  to  the  majority  to  decide.  In  a  state  of  emergency,  the  party
presidents at all levels (including the Federation) acted as the real decision-makers. This
position was sanctioned by legal provisions which made them ex ufficio heads of the
Committees  for  General  People  Defence  and  Social  Self-Protection  (ONO  i  DSZ)14.
Constitutional  provisions  also  made  party  presidents  ex-officio  members  of  the
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presidencies of their respective “socio-political communities” : including the President of
the LCY Central Committee who was the ninth member of the Federal State Presidency,
without a right of becoming its President or Vice-President. The position of the ninth
member  could  have  been of  crucial  importance  in  cases  such  as  a  stalemate  in  the
decision-making process: it would be up to the party representative to switch to this or
that side. 
15 This formula, based on Kardeljist political discourse was seen as crucial in preserving a
balance between nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia. 
 
Change of a Discourse : the Emergence of Majorities
and Minorities 
16 The  situation,  however,  changed  with  the  collapse  of  the  socialist  discourse.  In  the
Yugoslav case, this collapse happened gradually and to large extent before the eyes of
general public.  Between 1985 and 1987 the media had opened up for criticism of the
regime, but – more importantly – they started broadcasting live political events. In April
1987, Milošević’s speech to Serb and Montenegrin protesters in Kosovo Polje presented
the crisis of the Party in its full light. In September of the same year, TV cameras were
allowed to broadcast the session of the Serbian Central Committee in which Milošević’s
line prevailed over that of Ivan Stambolić.  By 1988, the direct TV broadcasting of the
Central  Committee  sessions  at  federal  level  became  a  general  practice.  With  this
broadcasting, the Party became transparent – more “human” but also clearly perceived as
weaker than ever. 
17 The extraordinary place which the LCY had in the political system (as explained above)
channelled all political conflicts towards the party itself. Soon it became clear that the
Party was in fact an un-elected parliament, much too pluralistic to formulate any vision
for the future of Yugoslavia. 
18 The crucial step towards the institutional ending of the Kardeljist concept, however, was
taken in 1988, when the party initiated (and Yugoslav Assembly accepted) a constitutional
amendment by which its direct representation in the Federal Presidency cease to exist.
The Central Committee also banned its members from holding state positions, and asked
members of all party committees to follow the same rule. The decision demonstrated the
Party’s  intention  to  separate  further  from the  state  structure,  and  thus  to  fulfil  its
promise  to  be  “leading”  but  not  “commanding”  force  in  society.  At  the  same  time,
however,  the  change  left  an  open  possibility  for  the  Federal  Presidency  to  enter  a
stalemate with eight,  rather than nine members.  This indeed soon happened.  On the
other hand, without a direct representation in the state structures, the Party (led by a
Croat Kardeljist Stipe Šuvar) remained a little more than a “chat room” with limited
influence over republics and now even over the federal institutions. 
19 The withdrawal of the Party representative from the Federal Presidency was a symbolic
sign of a fundamental change. Instead of relying on the decisive role of Party, the “state”
now had to rely on a majority of the votes. This first step was soon to be followed by
others. In May 1989 Slovenians voted for the first time for their representative in the
Federal  Presidency,  and elected Janez  Drnovšek,  the  first ever  member  who did  not
belong  to  the  LCY.  When  the  Party  collapsed  in  January  1990,  following  Slovenian
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withdrawal at the 14th Extraordinary Congress, there was little left to keep Yugoslavia
together. 
20 A couple of months later the republican organisations of the LCY renamed themselves
and – more importantly - allowed a new concept (the one of representative democracy) to
be introduced. 
21 This  new  discourse,  however,  contained  in  itself  notions  of  both  “majority”  and
“minority”. Representative democracy is rule by a majority, which is identified in free
and fair elections. Minorities are recognised and protected: but – they could hardly count
on  being  in  practice  in  everything  equal  with  the  majority.  Regardless  of  various
instruments of minority protection,  it  is  ultimately the majority that takes decisions.
Both the doctrine of “self-managing agreement and harmonisation” and the practise of
self-management, were now to be replaced by majority voting in which every citizen (not
republics or ethnic groups) was treated as equal to every other15. Instead of ideological
constructions  of  anti-state  “socio-political  communities”  (as  “a  new  form  of  social
organisation” which was to replace the state), a proper (Yugoslav) state was to be created.
Almost inevitably, representative democracy would create a Yugoslav demos instead of six
“constitutive nations” and “nationalities”.  Equally likely,  the existence of  a  Yugoslav
“civic  nation”  would  become  the  main  substance  of  a  democratic  Yugoslavia’s  new
identity, which would undermine already weak linguistic, religious, cultural and political
boundaries  between the  existing  “constitutive  nations”.  Ultimately,  a  Yugoslav  nation
would  emerge  as  a  product  of  representative  democracy.  In  normal  circumstances,
political parties and votes, as well as post-electoral coalitions would cut across ethnic
lines16. Creation of a Yugoslav democratic parliament, in which citizens would be treated
as  equal,  would  destroy  equality  between large  and small  nations,  but  also  between
“nations”  and “nationalities”.  Albanians  would,  for example,  in  this  parliament  have
more representatives than Slovenes, while Montenegrins could not count on one eighth
of the vote as they used to have in socialist Yugoslavia. What would, then, be left of
Yugoslavia, either as a country of South Slavs (as originally imagined) or as a Kardeljist
project of socialist alternative to statism ?
22 In the final phase before the collapse of the Yugoslav state, the main line of political
division ran between the supporters of the change (reformists of the constitution) and those
who opposed it (defenders of the constitution). When it appeared, the conflict was by no
means primarily ethnic. It was a political and ideological gap that divided the leaders :
those who wanted to re-establish a state (statists,  such as Milošević)  from those who
preferred the status quo and preservation of Kardeljist constitutive discourse (anti-statists
, such as Milan Kučan)17.
23 If one believes, as it is suggested here, that narratives are not only empty words without
any resonance among the population, then one can clearly see why so many people (and
especially political leaders) remained committed to the old, Kardeljist narrative, rather
than  accepted  a  new  one  which  would  imply  creation  of  a  Yugoslav  nation.  The
opposition to democratic changes by the anti-statists (defenders of the constitution) was
perfectly  rational  as  it  followed  the  political  interests  of  their  ethnic  groups  and
republics, as understood within the Kardeljist narrative. Being a “constitutive nation” in
Yugoslavia, with one eighth of the vote in Federal Presidency, Slovenes (for example) had
no reason to support a change which would make them only 8 % of the electorate and
deprive them of “veto-mechanisms” reserved for each republic and even in many cases
provinces.  Even less  they  had a  reason to  support a  one-member-one-vote  principle
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within the LCY, where their share was rapidly decreasing, only to reach five percent of
total membership by 198918. It made no sense for them to become a minority in a country
in which they had been treated as a “constitutive nation”. Slovenia’s fear of becoming a
minority in Yugoslavia was only secondarily linked with the proposed concepts of the
new Yugoslavia,  although it  was  clearly  encouraged by repressive nature of  political
actions undertaken or supported by the reformers of the constitution, mostly in Serbia.
But, as the Slovene authors clearly said in a series of articles published in the Nova Revija
magazine19any Yugoslavia,  even the most  democratic  one (and -  one may conclude -
especially the most democratic one) would be unacceptable to Slovenes (and in fact many
others) if they had to become a minority in it20.  Even to Serbs, who were the largest
nation in Yugoslavia, a democratic Yugoslavia was acceptable only for as long as they
were winning in political arena within it. As their refusal to accept a vote of confidence
against their representative in the Federal Party Presidency Dušan Čkrebić demonstrated
at the 17th CC LCY Session (17 October 1988), the Serbs also feared becoming a minority in
Yugoslavia, and therefore – as the previous narrative used to say in a pejorative way –
“outvoted” (nadglasani) by an “anti-Serb coalition”21. The fear of becoming a minority in
Yugoslavia encouraged separatist forces within Serbian nation, which has been for the
whole 20th century divided to “pro-Yugoslav” and “pro-Serbian” groups 22.  Although a
majority  of  Serbs  remained  ultimately  committed  to  a  Yugoslav,  not  a  Serbian
orientation, tolerance towards free expression of Serbian separatist nationalism in other
republics of the former Yugoslavia further encouraged fears on the side of the majorities
in these republics. Serbian, Slovenian (and later certainly Croatian) nationalism indeed
fed each other with excuses for their own existence. 
24 The same reason why the Slovenes rejected the democratisation of Yugoslavia, explains
why the Serbs rejected the creation of Croatian and Bosnian demos in these two newly
independent states after the collapse of Yugoslavia. They feared becoming a minority in
territories in which once they had been treated as “constitutive nations”.  So did the
Croats in Bosnia. This was especially the case when the new minorities faced a high birth-
rate by new majorities, such as in Kosovo (and to lesser extent – Bosnia) or a strong
tendency towards “ethnically mixed marriages” which encouraged the trend of creating
“Yugoslavs”  (especially  in  Bosnia  and  certain  parts  of  Croatia).  Fears  of  being
“swallowed” by the new majority – which had already been seen as threat to the achieved
ethnic status – created a core of a new narrative. It offered a good starting point for
myths, which were then created by leading intellectuals and political actors. Ultimately,
it led to crimes against families in both Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts. 
 
Conclusion
25 The  replacement  of  one  (communist)  narrative  by  another  (potentially  liberal-
democratic) produced a massive instability and disturbance in inter-ethnic relations in
Yugoslavia. Everyone felt somehow endangered by the possibility of losing their status as
a “constitutive nation” (or, indeed a “nationality”) and becoming once again a simple and
powerless  “minority”.  Although many of  the new leaders  were in favour of  citizens’
equality within their own republics (they in fact refused to recognise collective rights and
identities within them), they stubbornly opposed implementation of the same principle at
the Yugoslav level. In doing so, they often relied on Kardeljist argument that Yugoslav
nations are ‘completed’ and that an idea of a “Yugoslav nation” represents not only an
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illusion but a dangerous demand on the sides of either pro-Soviet (“unitarist”) or pro-
bourgeois (“anti-socialist”) forces23. In any attempt to constitute a united Yugoslav state
(regardless of the level of autonomy offered to its constitutive parts) they saw either a
renewal of the “Ranković era” or renewal of “pre-war Great-Serbian domination”.
26 Both Kardeljist leaders and ethnic nationalists in the opposition rejected a democratic
Yugoslavia which would make every ethnic group what it indeed was : a minority. And in
doing so, they were not irrational from the point of view of their own interests. Nor were
they irrational from the point of view of the imagined interests of their own ethnic groups
and republics / provinces. Why would they agree to be a minority in Yugoslavia, when
they can be a majority in their own republics ? And since they could not be a majority in
Yugoslavia, the choice was indeed reduced to a simple one : minority in a large state or
majority in a smaller one. For political elites,  already powerful in their republics but
increasingly powerless  at  federal  level,  the choice was the one between keeping and
strengthening power on the one hand and risking to lose it on the other. It made a lot of
sense to them to opt for the former, rather than later. By choosing a path of separation,
the former constitutive nations became majorities in their own republics. But, significant
segments were left outside – and most of them refused to become “minorities”. So did
Albanians from Kosovo, which perhaps longer than others remained committed (and not
without a good reason !) to Kardeljist concept of “no minorities – no majorities”. 
27 The refusal of those parts of the former constitutive nations which were now separated
by borders from their “national state” to became “minorities” in their new states, as well
as  of  the former “nationalities”  (Albanians)  to  become minorities  in a  new Yugoslav
federation (Serbia-Montenegro) was the main motivator of their actions against those
new states. These actions were not primarily due to some mystic remote control from this
or that capital  of  newly created states,  although the common understanding and the
nationalist character of the new paradigm often brought leaders of the same ethnic group
together, regardless of the state borders between them. 
28 The fear of becoming a minority was real and strong in all parts of the former Yugoslavia
in a situation of fundamental uncertainty about the future of the country. In Slovenia,
those fears increased following the Janša trial in 1988. While in April 1988 (before the
trial), 25,4 % of Slovenes said they felt « fear and hope at the same time for the future of
the country and / or themselves », and 26,1 % felt « fear and worry only », these figures
rose to 33,9 % and 36,2 % respectively by October 1988 (after the arrest). « Fear » was,
therefore, the word which 70,1 % of Slovenes used to describe their feelings on the eve of
198924. These fears were not produced by some foreign power, as was often the case in
previous years. In April 1988, only 1,5 % of Slovenes believed Yugoslavia was endangered
from the West,  and 5,9 % saw danger in the East,  while an additional 25,8 % said the
potential danger came « from them both ». If one takes all those who saw any danger
from any of the sides together, it was still the case that two thirds (66,2 %) of Slovenes
saw no danger at all from anywhere outside. The source of fear was inside the country,
but outside Slovenia – in Belgrade.
29 In  Belgrade,  however,  a  majority  of  the  population  felt  the  same  sense  of  fear  and
uncertainty. In October 1990, only 3,1 % of Serbian population did not feel « worry » or
« fear » for their personal future and that of their families, while 66,4 % had a « Messianic
attitude » described in a sentence : « I am afraid, but I think we can find a way out, if we
are united »25. The combination of fears and hopes, both in Slovenia and in Serbia (and
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later in Croatia too) was a perfect pretext for the emergence of authoritarian leaders and
“revolutionary” actions they proposed for ending the crisis26.
30 Those fears were by no means faked : they were real and strong. They originated in a
sense  of  losing  something  that  had  been  achieved  and  guaranteed  before.  In  the
Slovenian case, it was a fear of losing a status of the constitutive nation and of “nation
state”, as recognised in Kardelj’s concept of the self-managing Yugoslavia. In the Serbian
case,  it  was  fear  of  losing  Yugoslavia,  which  for  the  largest  number  of  Serbs  was
unacceptable27.
31 Those fears were additionally constructed by the main representatives of the “culture of
apocalypse” which was developed by the leading anti-regime intellectuals (especially in
Serbia and Slovenia) during the 1980s28. Under a wide umbrella of “breaking with taboos”,
the leading members of the intellectual elite offered alternative interpretations of recent
history (mostly of  the WW-II  and immediate post-war tragic events)  reminding their
readership of evil on the side of this or that other nation in Yugoslavia. Those authors
mostly shared an ultra-conservative understanding of history and basically believed that
« in history there are no accidents and that, in essence, almost nothing is new »29. Thus
everything tends to repeat itself almost inevitably, and the reminiscences of the past
fears were now easily transformed into fears for the future. What happened in 1941-1945
might and will happen again, they argued. The genocide committed in the old times of
the Ottoman Empire, or during the Independent State of Croatia (the Ustashe regime in
Croatia  and Bosnia-Herzegovina)  against  the Serbs  will  happen again.  As  Bogdanović
argued analysing the new rhetoric, offered as a replacement for the Kardeljist narrative,
its  main  characteristic  was  that  there  was  no  clear  line  between  myth  and  reality,
between death and life, between past and future30.
32 The  rhetoric  of  apocalypse31 and  the  ultra-conservative  interpretation  of  history
developed within  the  tolerated groups  of  intellectual  counter-elites  fell  onto  fruitful
ground of fears and uncertainties. One should not forget that this all happened within a
context of a collapsing anti-statism which provided a loose understanding of political
obligation and which never developed a proper rule of law. A socialist state, weakened to
an almost  anarchic  situation by  its  own commitment  to  anti-statist doctrine  and by
challenges from the outside of  it,  was now far too weak to survive.  Being unable to
protect its citizens from the increasingly felt threat to their own existence, the state in
fact  opened its  doors  to  a  “war-of-all-against-all”  situation.  It  should not  be  a  great
surprise then that various nationalist and statists presented themselves as “saviours of
the nation” by offering an authoritarian style of governing in almost all post-Yugoslav
independent states. The emergence of strong and authoritarian states may be understood
only within a context of non-existent “state”, which was “withering away” in the end of
the 1980s. They were not only a product of authoritarian features of the main leaders in
those states,  but also of  a perception of  needs on the part  of  large segments (newly
created majorities) of their population.
33 The aggression that followed was only a further step, another result of this perception.
Fears of becoming minority were easily manipulated before they were transformed into
aggression towards others. This aggression was seen as a pure self-defence, as a reaction
to injustice and a tool of self-protection. We need to look here for the roots of the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia, and also for reasons why even today, after a whole decade,
many former Yugoslavs still believe that the wars of the 1990s were just and justified. 
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NOTES
1.  The notion of the “main” ethnic groups refers to Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Although the
Yugoslav  constitution  treated  all  nations  as  equal,  both  political  elite  and  counter-elites
recognised that these three groups had larger influence on Yugoslav politics than others. The
former LCY CC President Stipe Šuvar confirmed this in interview I conducted with him in January
1998. For an interesting classification of nations in Yugoslavia from the point of view of a leading
Slovenian “dissident” see Urbančič (Ivan), « The Yugoslav “nationalist crisis” and the Slovenes
in the perspective of the end of nations », Nova Revija, (57), 1987.
2.  The construction of new reality (as socialism defined its objective) demanded the replacement
of old terms linked to the existence of the state with new ones that belonged to the self-managing
glossary.  Some  of  these  words  are  almost  impossible  to  translate  into  any  West  European
language since they were invented to describe institutions uniquely linked to a new form of
social  organisation. Others had a different connotation than it  was the case in the West.  For
example, state and statism,  which were both used with a negative connotation – as something
opposed to self-management. 
3. The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists, Belgrade, 1958, p. 128.
4. Kardelj  (Edvard),  « Thirty  years  after  the  founding  congress  of  the  Communist  Party  of
Slovenia » [1967], in The Nations and Socialism, STP : Belgrade, 1980, p. 47.
5.  In 1981, 13,4 % of the Yugoslav adult population were members of the LCY. Only in Slovenia
the share was below 10 % - 9,1. In 1983, however, membership of the LCY began to decrease. 
6.  The main political conflicts within the Yugoslav political elite were in fact structured over the
question of how much repression is desirable and necessary against the “anti-socialist forces”. It
is  today  very  popular  to  argue  that  the  main  conflicts  were  always  ethnic :  but  neither  the
removal of Ranković (1966), nor the action taken against the Croatian Spring (1971), or Serbian
“Liberals” in 1972 were primarily motivated by ethnic reasons. All these were primarily intra-
ethnic conflict between members of political elites who had different views on the importance
and necessity  of  repression  and  “ideo-political  work”.  For  this  see  Tripalo  (Miko),  Hrvatsko
proljeće, Zagreb : Globus, 1991 ; Perović (Latinka), Zatvaranje kruga : ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ
1971-1972, Sarajevo : Svjetlost, 1991 ; and Marković (Dragoslav Draža), Život i politika, Vol. 1-2.
Beograd : Rad, 1987-1988. The same goes for conflicts in the post-Tito period : Šuvar-Špiljak in
Croatia, or Stambolić-Milošević in Serbia.
7.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Yugoslavia  began  the  last  phase  of  its  decentralisation  in  the
mid-1960s, when both West and East faced a crisis of “statism”, i.e. at the time of the massive
leftist protests in the West, and the Czechoslovak crisis in the East. Yugoslav communists were
certainly not forced to initiate such changes – on the contrary, the only relevant protests against
the regime (the student protests in Belgrade in 1968) urged them to introduce more “equality”
and more state intervention, rather than to decentralise political system. With a bit of cynicism,
one could conclude that in Yugoslavia leaders wanted the state to wither away, while majority of
population (especially workers) wanted less self-management and more state intervention.
8.  For Kardelj’s views on this see his last book, Kardelj (Edvard),  « Ways of Democracy in a
Socialist Society » [1977], in Self-Management and the Political System, Belgrade : STP, 1980.
9.  Kardelj believed that vision is the key to the unity of a nation. As he said in 1977 : « The unity
of the nation is not possible unless based on a clear platform, on a clear outlook for the future
development of society » (ibid., p. 263). This is why the unity of Yugoslavia, in fact, ultimately
depended on the Party itself. 
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10.  This is why the key ideological issue was “reform of education system”. Croatian Communist
ideologue Stipe Šuvar was notorious for his attempt to bring the education system in line with
Marxist idea of an “association of free producers”. He fought “elitism” and introduced courses
such as « Marxism », « Theory and Practice of Self-Managing Socialism » and « Production and
Technical Education » as compulsory to all high-school curricula.
11.  The totalitarian potential of communism as well as its extreme sensitivity to all intellectual
activities (even the most benign ones, such as poems, etc.) had its roots in this vision. For the
importance  of  words  in  socialism,  see  Havel  (Vaclav),  « A  Word  About  Words »  [1989]  and
« Power of the Powerless » [1978], in Open Letters, London : Faber and Faber, 1991.
12. Tito (Josip Broz), « The LCY in the Struggle for the Further Development of Socialist, Self-
Managing and Non-Aligned Yugoslavia » (Speech at the 11th Congress of the LCY), in 11th Congress
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Belgrade : STP, 1978, p. 65.
13. Milo{evi|,  (Slobodan),  « Noć  i  zora u Kosovu Poqu » [Speech in Kosovo Polje,  24-25 April
1987], in Godine raspleta. Beorad : BIGZ, 1989, p. 143.
14. Had`ić (Miroslav), « The Army’s Use of Trauma » [1996], in Popov (Nebojša), ed., The Road to
War in Serbia, Budapest : CEU Press, 2000.
15.  It  is  often argued that  self-management was no more than an “empty word” with little
correspondence with what happened in reality. I do not subscribe to this interpretation. In only
four years following the introduction of the Law on Associated Labour (1976-1980), about 94 000
basic organisations of associated labour were created in Yugoslavia. Between 1,25 and 1,5 million
directives, orders, contracts and other obligatory acts were enacted throughout the system in the
first post-Constitutional years (Bilandžić (Dušan), Jugoslavia poslije Tita 1980-1985, Zagreb : Globus,
1986, p.  39).  In many cases,  such as those described by I.  Stambolić  (Stambolić  (Ivan),  Put u
Bespuće,  Belgrade :  B92,  1995,  p.  44),  a  small  minority  of  workers  was  able  to  veto  majority.
Stambolić remembers a case where « seven thousand workers voted for a decision, but the BOAL
of the Catering Services voted 31 against and 29 for. Because of these two votes, 7 000 workers
could  not  realise  their  self-managing  will ».  Although  it  clearly  could  not  break  the  LCY’s
monopoly  in  political  sphere,  the  self-managing  system  took  deep  roots  in  the  sphere  of
production. Self-managing was not jut an empty parole by the regime. It was an illusion to expect
it would be “wiped away” from people’s memories over night. In fact, some of its key elements
came back in workers’ protests against privatisation and the corruption of the new authorities in
the late 1990s.
16.  The last Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Marković, begun the process of creating a Yugoslav
party, and there were originally encouraging signs of support for this concept. In its last pre-war
phase,  the  main  conflict  was  between  Marković’s  type  of  Yugoslavism  and  republican
nationalisms. However, the institutional structure of Yugoslavia helped Marković’s  opponents
because its main purpose was to disable any Yugoslav “unitarism” and “hegemonism”. Marković,
therefore, faced a choice : either to act anti-constitutionally in his attempt to save Yugoslavia or
to act constitutionally but with slim chances of saving it. A democratic and united Yugoslavia was
becoming as improbable as a Communist-led united Yugoslavia. Not many, however, realised this
until  very  late.  For  example,  as  the  last  US  Ambassador  to  Yugoslavia  (1988-1992)  Warren
Zimmermann writes, the US Government believed that « unity and democracy were the Siamese
twins of  Yugoslavia’s  fate… the loss of  one meant that the other would die »  (Zimmermann
(Warren),  Origins  of  a  Catastrophe,  New York :  Random House,  1996,  p.  6).  Marković  basically
believed the same. However, both Marković’s term in office and American policy in the Balkans
ended in failure, partly because they did not understand this.
17.  This line of division largely cut across ethnic lines within the Yugoslav political elite – for
example,  Croatian political  leaders of Serb ethnic origins (such as Dušan Dragosavac,  Milutin
Baltić, etc.) and those from Vojvodina were on the opposite side from the majority of the Serbian
leadership. At the same time, as in many previous occasions, the main divisions were within the
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same  ethnic  group,  not  between  them :  for  example,  between  Slobodan  Milošević  and  Ivan
Stambolić in Serbia; and Mika Špiljak and Stipe Šuvar in Croatia, etc.
18.  For details  of  ethnic structure of the LCY see Burg (Burg (Stephan),  « New Data on the
League of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia »,  Slavic  Review,  46,  1987,  p.  553).  The Slovenian LC had
126 437  members  in  1982.  The  Slovenes  made  up  5,2 %  of  the  Party,  less  than  any  other
constitutive  nation  in  Yugoslavia  (including  the  Montenegrins,  four  times  smaller  in  total
population). This share was further decreasing (and rapidly so) in the mid-1980s. 
19. Nova Revija, (57), january 1987.
20.  One  of  the  Nova  Revija authors,  Tine  Hribar,  opposed  both  “Yugoslavism”  and
“Yugoslavianism”  (jugoslovanstvo,  jugoslavijanstvo),  i.e.  both  Yugoslav  nation  in  ethnic  and  in
political sense respectively. For him, both were equally unacceptable. Both of them would make
Slovenians only a minority within a unitary state (Hribar (Tine), « Slovenska dr`avnost », Nova
Revija, (57), 1987). In arguing in favour of independence, many of the Nova Revija authors (such as
Jambrek (Peter), « Pravica do samoodločbe slovenskega naroda », Nova Revija 57, 1987, p. 166 ;
Urbančič (Ivan), loc. cit., p. 44) used Kardelj’s anti-statist concept, which recognised republics as
states  to  support  their  arguments.  Slovenian  nationalist  opposed  Yugoslav  “unitarism”,  not
Serbian nationalism. France Bučar and Ivan Urbančič in fact even supported Serbian nationalist
claims, but clearly demanded that their Serb counterparts should dissociate themselves from any
trace of Yugoslav unitarism (Bučar (France), « Slovenija med Balkanom in Evropo », Nova Revija,
(91),  1989,  p.  1497 ;  Urbančič  (Ivan),  loc.  cit.,  p.  39).  Finally,  it  is  on  this  platform that  the
opposition agreed with the President of the Slovenian LC CC Milan Kučan. On 17 June 1989, Kučan
said : « When we think about the idea that a majority vote should be introduced in a multi-ethnic
federation, we ask : is this anything else but a denial of the equality of the peoples, a denial of
sovereignty and of their right to self-determination as an inalienable human right » (Borba, 19
June 1989). During the first common action by the LCY and Slovenian opposition, at Cankarjev
Dom in Ljubljana in February 1989, Kučan said that if policy against Kosovo Albanians continued,
« this would be a very clear announcement that the minority nations and nationalities will first
be pushed to the margins, and then out of the country, abroad or who knows where » (Bilić
(Jovan), Bilbija (Djuro), Slovenija i Srbija od Cankarjevog Doma do Jugoalata i Gazimestana, Belgrade :
Tera, 1989, p. 30).
21.  The term is coined by Macedonian member of the SFRY Presidency Vasil Tupurkovski – yet
another  illustration  of  the  conclusion  presented  here  that  the  line  of  division  within  the
leadership cut across ethnic lines and did not play the crucial role at that time (1988), as often
argued today. For the 17th Session, see Šuvar (Stipe), Nezavrseni mandat 1-2, Zagreb : Globus, 1989.
22. Pavković (Aleksandar), « From Yugoslavism to Serbism : the Serb national idea 1986-1996 »,
Nations and Nationalism, 4, 1998.
23.  Not even the present-day Serbia has abandoned this crucial idea of Kardeljist concept. The
FRY does  not  aim  at  creating  a  Yugoslav  nation  out  of  Serbs,  Montenegrins,  Albanians  and
Hungarians, but remains committed (even after the latest Constitutional change in June 2000) to
idea of the equality of two – by size very uneven – nations (Serbs and Montenegrins) and their
“sovereign states” (Montenegro and Serbia).
24. Toš (Niko), ed., Slovensko Javno Mnenje 1988-1989, Ljubljana : Delavska Enotnost, 1989, p. 132.
25. Obradović  (Marija),  « Vladajuča  stranka :  ideologija  i  tehnologija  dominacije »,  in  Popov
(Nebojša), ur., Srpska strana rata, Belgrade : Republika, 1996, p. 494.
26.  About the role of fears in Serbian politics under Milošević, see Djilas (Aleksa), Razgovori za
Jugoslaviju,  Belgrade :  Prometej,  1993.  Also,  Richard West’s  description of  new atmosphere  in
Belgrade following the Eighth Session of the CC LC Serbia in September 1987. West, himself a
frequent visitor to Belgrade since 1945, writes : « For the first time since I had known Belgrade
[so, since 1945 !], I was warned by friends against careless talk in public places, and still more on
the telephone. People were keeping their voices down in the café of the Moskva Hotel… » (West
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(Richard), Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, London : Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994, p. 345). For
fears among the political elite, see Bogdanović’s analysis of the rhetoric of the Eighth Session.
Bogdanović concluded that Milošević’s fraction demonstrated « an almost unbelievable fear, real
panic of polysemia, of the pluralist meaning of words and speeches, even in describing obviously
pluralist events » (Bogdanović (Bogdan), Mrtvou`ice : Mentalne zamke staljinizma, Zagreb : August
Cesarec, 1988, p. 20). For the sense of fear among members of the Yugoslav political elite, see
memoirs by B. Jović  (Jović (Borisav), Poslednji dani SFRJ, Belgrade : Politika, 1995) – entries on
Petar Gračanin and Veljko Kadijević. 
27.  This is why in 1990 they voted against Vuk Drašković’s Serbian Resistance Movement, in
favour of a more pro-Yugoslav Milošević’s  Socialist Party of Serbia.  As an illustration of how
unpopular were even symbols of Serbian nationalism, see Thompson (Mark), Proizvodnja rata :
mediji u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, Belgrade : Medija centar / Radio B-92, 1995, p. 88. He
quotes  from the  instructions  to  Serbian TV editors  in  1990  whom the  government  asked to
remove from their reports « nationalist symbols [which were] unacceptable to the majority of
viewers », such as Chetnik symbols and old Serbian flags (without a red star).
28. Ramet (Pedro), Yugoslavia in the 1980s’, Boulder / London : Westview Press, 1985.
29. Tudjman (Franjo), Horrors of War [1989], New York : M. Evans and Company, Inc, 1996, p. 3.
30. Bogdanović (Bogdan), op. cit., p. 23.
31. Ramet (Pedro), op. cit.
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